{"id":41765,"date":"2026-11-14T23:56:00","date_gmt":"2026-11-14T15:56:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/?p=41765"},"modified":"2026-08-18T18:01:41","modified_gmt":"2026-08-18T10:01:41","slug":"the-fairfax-way","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/","title":{"rendered":"&#8220;The Fairfax Way&#8221;"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<div id=\"ez-toc-container\" class=\"ez-toc-v2_0_89 counter-hierarchy ez-toc-counter ez-toc-custom ez-toc-container-direction\">\n<div class=\"ez-toc-title-container\">\n<p class=\"ez-toc-title\" style=\"cursor:inherit\">Table of Contents<\/p>\n<span class=\"ez-toc-title-toggle\"><a href=\"#\" class=\"ez-toc-pull-right ez-toc-btn ez-toc-btn-xs ez-toc-btn-default ez-toc-toggle\" aria-label=\"Toggle Table of Content\"><span class=\"ez-toc-js-icon-con\"><span class=\"\"><span class=\"eztoc-hide\" style=\"display:none;\">Toggle<\/span><span class=\"ez-toc-icon-toggle-span\"><svg style=\"fill: #ffffff;color:#ffffff\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" class=\"list-377408\" width=\"20px\" height=\"20px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" fill=\"none\"><path d=\"M6 6H4v2h2V6zm14 0H8v2h12V6zM4 11h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2zM4 16h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2z\" fill=\"currentColor\"><\/path><\/svg><svg style=\"fill: #ffffff;color:#ffffff\" class=\"arrow-unsorted-368013\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" width=\"10px\" height=\"10px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" version=\"1.2\" baseProfile=\"tiny\"><path d=\"M18.2 9.3l-6.2-6.3-6.2 6.3c-.2.2-.3.4-.3.7s.1.5.3.7c.2.2.4.3.7.3h11c.3 0 .5-.1.7-.3.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7zM5.8 14.7l6.2 6.3 6.2-6.3c.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7c-.2-.2-.4-.3-.7-.3h-11c-.3 0-.5.1-.7.3-.2.2-.3.5-.3.7s.1.5.3.7z\"\/><\/svg><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<nav><ul class='ez-toc-list ez-toc-list-level-1 ' ><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-1\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Fairfax_Overview\" >Fairfax Overview<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-2\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Stock_Return_Comparable_to_Berkshire_Hathaway\" >Stock Return Comparable to Berkshire Hathaway<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-3\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Fairfax_is_Baby_Berkshire_Hathaway\" >Fairfax is Baby Berkshire Hathaway<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-4\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#What_kind_of_company_is_Fairfax\" >What kind of company is Fairfax?<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-5\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Prem_Watsa_is_known_as_the_Canadian_Buffett\" >Prem Watsa is known as the Canadian Buffett<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-6\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Contents_of_The_Fairfax_Way\" >Contents of The Fairfax Way<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-7\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Key_Content\" >Key Content<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-8\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Several_People_Who_Influenced_Wattsar\" >Several People Who Influenced Wattsar<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-9\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#He_made_the_same_mistake_as_Buffett_early_on\" >He made the same mistake as Buffett early on<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-10\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Early_Career\" >Early Career<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-11\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Founding_HWIC_and_Acquiring_Markel_Finance\" >Founding HWIC and Acquiring Markel Finance<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-12\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Guided_by_Value_Investing\" >Guided by Value Investing<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-13\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Fairfax_Financial_Holdings\" >Fairfax Financial Holdings<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-14\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Multiple_Accurate_Predictions_of_Market_Overheating\" >Multiple Accurate Predictions of Market Overheating<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-15\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Acquisitions_of_Crum_Forster\" >Acquisitions of Crum &amp; Forster<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-16\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#View_on_Long-Term_Stock_Performance\" >View on Long-Term Stock Performance<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-17\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Regarding_the_issue_of_shares_at_a_discount\" >Regarding the issue of shares at a discount<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-18\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Funding_Acquisitions_with_Share_Issuance\" >Funding Acquisitions with Share Issuance<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-19\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Short_Selling\" >Short Selling<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-20\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Allied_the_Largest_Acquisition_in_History\" >Allied, the Largest Acquisition in History<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-21\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#A_Typical_Value_Investor\" >A Typical Value Investor<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-22\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Value_Investing_Masters_Who_Influenced_Him\" >Value Investing Masters Who Influenced Him<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-23\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Books_that_influenced_him\" >Books that influenced him<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-24\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Increasing_Emphasis_on_Corporate_Quality\" >Increasing Emphasis on Corporate Quality<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-25\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Long-Term_Investing\" >Long-Term Investing<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-26\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#How_to_Track_Good_Companies\" >How to Track Good Companies?<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-27\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Share_Buybacks\" >Share Buybacks<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-28\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Dividend_Payments\" >Dividend Payments<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-29\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Company_Acquisition_Principles\" >Company Acquisition Principles<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-30\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Operating_Guidelines_for_Subsidiaries\" >Operating Guidelines for Subsidiaries<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-31\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Credit_Rating_Agencies_Dislike_Fairfax\" >Credit Rating Agencies Dislike Fairfax<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-32\" href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2026\/11\/14\/the-fairfax-way\/#Relative_articles\" >Relative articles<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/nav><\/div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Fairfax_Overview\"><\/span>Fairfax Overview<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>I introduced Fairfax Financial Holdings in my previous post, &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2022\/12\/17\/dear-shareholder\/\">Dear Shareholder<\/a>&#8220;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Stock_Return_Comparable_to_Berkshire_Hathaway\"><\/span>Stock Return Comparable to Berkshire Hathaway<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>In the post of &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2022\/12\/17\/dear-shareholder\/\">Dear Shareholder<\/a>&#8220;, I mentioned that Fairfax stock had an average annualized return of 17.1% from 1985 to 2018.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Since Fairfax&#8217;s IPO in 1985, under CEO Prem Watsa&#8217;s leadership, the annualized shareholder return has reached 19.5%; during the same period, the S&amp;P 500 only returned 11.3%, and the Toronto market slightly above 8%. The stock price performance over the past five years is an astonishing 328.37%, a rare achievement for a large financial holding group.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Over the first 13 years, the annualized stock return was 48%, and the annualized book value growth was 41%. During the same period, only one Canadian company and two US companies had a faster stock price compounding rate than Fairfax. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Fairfax_is_Baby_Berkshire_Hathaway\"><\/span>Fairfax is Baby Berkshire Hathaway<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Fairfax&#8217;s annualized stock return over the past 40 years is a remarkable 19.5%, a figure quite close to Buffett&#8217;s 19.8% over 61 years. However, the market capitalization difference\u2014US$38.46 billion to US$1.1 trillion\u2014is still enormous, a point investors should note.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"What_kind_of_company_is_Fairfax\"><\/span>What kind of company is Fairfax?<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The diversified Fairfax Financial Holdings Group employs a decentralized management structure and is widely considered one of the closest to Buffett&#8217;s management style of Berkshire Hathaway.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Prem_Watsa_is_known_as_the_Canadian_Buffett\"><\/span>Prem Watsa is known as the Canadian Buffett<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Prem Watsa, of Indian descent, is often referred to as the Canadian Buffett, and Berkshire Hathaway&#8217;s current CEO, Greg Abel, is also from Canada. Fairfax CEO Prem Watsa is highly regarded for his business acumen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Fairfax is also known as the Canadian Berkshire Hathaway.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Contents_of_The_Fairfax_Way\"><\/span>Contents of <em>The Fairfax Way<\/em><span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p><em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/-\/zh_TW\/Fairfax-Way-Inside-Lasting-Success\/dp\/1037802195\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Fairfax Way<\/a><\/em> is the first book in which Prem Watsa and his team publicly reveal the story behind the success of Fairfax Financial Holdings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Prem Watsa successfully replicated Warren Buffett&#8217;s model, using &#8220;float&#8221; generated from insurance assets to build a $45 billion global empire through value investing. The book details how Fairfax made those legendary contrarian trades, being greedy when others were fearful, and even winning on billions of dollars in bets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This book is not only a business history, but also a manual on how values \u200b\u200bcan be translated into profits. Prem Watsa has proven to investors over 40 years that you can become one of the world&#8217;s most successful investors while remaining kind and honest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The first half of this book tells the story of the company, while the second half delves deeper, helping readers understand Prem Wattsar&#8217;s company and discussing the characteristics of Prem Wattsar and his team in value investing, management strategies, and culture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Key_Content\"><\/span>Key Content<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Several_People_Who_Influenced_Wattsar\"><\/span>Several People Who Influenced Wattsar<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>In investing, Prem Wattsar was primarily influenced by the value investing principles of Warren Buffett and Ben Graham. He frequently quoted Graham&#8217;s wisdom, reminding investors to maintain their strategy and think long-term when market volatility occurs: &#8220;An investor with a sound stock portfolio should expect stock prices to fluctuate, and should not be alarmed by sharp declines or excited by sharp rises. He should always remember that market quotes are there to make things easier for him, either to be used or ignored.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Prem Wattsar was greatly influenced by John Templeton and Napoleon Hill&#8217;s <em>Think and Grow Rich<\/em> in his life and value beliefs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>John Templeton was a key figure influencing Prem Wattsar&#8217;s global investment approach, adopting a global value perspective and consistently focusing on finding cheaper ways to acquire future returns. Therefore, unlike Buffett, Prem Wattsar held numerous assets outside North America, distributed across the globe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"He_made_the_same_mistake_as_Buffett_early_on\"><\/span>He made the same mistake as Buffett early on<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Prem Wattsar initially favored acquiring distressed insurance companies at low prices, a short-sighted, frugal value strategy that resulted in longer and more volatile costs later on to achieve sustained profitability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The reason this volatile performance persisted was the company&#8217;s phenomenal investment success, sometimes even significantly offsetting the losses from distressed insurance companies. Twenty years later, this relationship reversed as the restructured insurance companies completely collapsed, and the investment department faltered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Fairfax did not buy back its own shares like most companies do; instead, it engaged in stock swaps. Through this exchange, Fairfax never actually bought the shares; instead, they spent less money to buy the right to raise or lower the share price, because the stock had already crashed during the pandemic, and Prem Watsa believed it couldn&#8217;t fall any further. The result was that the company nearly went bankrupt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Early_Career\"><\/span>Early Career<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Prem Watsa, from India, joined Confederation Life in Canada. His boss gave him a copy of Graham&#8217;s <em>Security Analysis<\/em>, which changed his life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Founding_HWIC_and_Acquiring_Markel_Finance\"><\/span>Founding HWIC and Acquiring Markel Finance<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>After nine years, in September 1984, he co-founded Hamblin Watsa Investment Advisors (HWIC). In the summer of 1985, he saw the near-bankrupt Canadian truck insurance asset, Markel Finance, sparking his imagination. He immediately realized how Buffett made money: as long as you have cash on hand to cover future claims, you can run an independent business and use its cash reserves to generate additional returns. The acquisition and controlling stake in Markel Finance, much like Warren Buffett&#8217;s acquisition of Berkshire Hathaway, transformed Prem Wattsar&#8217;s life. He gained a truly controlling financial company, from which he built his financial empire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Guided_by_Value_Investing\"><\/span>Guided by Value Investing<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>In his first letter to shareholders of Markel Finance in 1985, he wrote: &#8220;Our investment philosophy is based on Graham&#8217;s value approach, practiced by his famous disciple, Buffett.&#8221; &#8220;This means we buy shares of financially sound companies at a price below their long-term value. We expect to accumulate profits over time, not in the next month or two. In fact, the share price may be far below our cost in the short term. In our purchasing process, we always prioritize protecting your capital from long-term losses before considering profits.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&#8220;Our primary objective is to operate the company for the long-term benefit of all shareholders.&#8221; Prem Wattsar also clearly set financial goals in his first letter: &#8220;How should you evaluate our performance? We believe all companies should be measured by after-tax return on common shareholders&#8217; equity. In Canada, the average return on shareholders&#8217; equity has been approximately 13% over decades. Our goal is to achieve an average long-term return of 20% while maintaining the company&#8217;s financial strength.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Fairfax_Financial_Holdings\"><\/span>Fairfax Financial Holdings<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>After beating its biggest truck insurance competitor, expanding its revenue and business, and then acquiring Sphere Reinsurance Company of Canada, Markel Finance\u2026 Finance began to &#8220;diversify,&#8221; introducing new business lines to the holding company. In 1987, the company was renamed Fairfax Financial Holdings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Multiple_Accurate_Predictions_of_Market_Overheating\"><\/span><strong>Multiple Accurate Predictions of Market Overheating<\/strong><span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Before the 1987 crash, Prem Wattsar and his colleagues observed the Dow Jones Industrial Average surging over 40% in the previous seven months. Before the crash, when investors flocked to the market hoping for easy profits, he and the HWIC team sold half of the company&#8217;s stock portfolio, making a substantial profit. In the following years, Fairfax made many prudent macro-level predictions about the financial markets, most notably a major short-selling of the US housing market before the global financial crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In his 1987 letter to shareholders, he wrote: &#8220;We believe the main risk is the collapse of the highly speculative Japanese stock and real estate markets.&#8221; The Nikkei index had just surged 43% in 1986, then rose another 15%, and the following year it rose another 40%. The Nikkei consistently defied the market in 1989, with its stock price soaring 29% until the bubble burst and the market collapsed. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It took a staggering 35 years to recapture its 1980s peak. Fairfax&#8217;s advice was wise. Fairfax supported this view by purchasing put options on the Nikkei 225 index. The Nikkei 225 peaked at 38,915 points on December 29, 1989, before falling to 23,848 points by the end of 1990, a drop of approximately 39%. The 1990 fiscal year annual report revealed the realized gains from these put options.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Acquisitions_of_Crum_Forster\"><\/span>Acquisitions of Crum &amp; Forster<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>However, the company continued to test different industries and insurance lines after 1987, such as claims and debt collection. This development strategy did not go smoothly in the first few years; some acquisitions or business expansions not only caused the company to lose money but also plunged it into crisis. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In 1998, Fairfax Financial Holdings completed its acquisition of Crum &amp; Forster for $565 million in cash. This acquisition expanded Fairfax&#8217;s commercial insurance business in the United States and increased its specialized underwriting capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"View_on_Long-Term_Stock_Performance\"><\/span>View on Long-Term Stock Performance<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Since its founding in 1985, 1992 marked the first time its return on capital had not exceeded 20%. Prem Vatesa emphasized that investors should focus less on revenue or earnings per share and more on book value. Vatesa wrote, &#8220;We expect to encounter as many problems as we have in the past, or even more, but we expect to continue to compound book value per share at a rate exceeding 20% \u200b\u200bin the long term.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Prem Vatesa stated: &#8220;We do not have an investor relations department. We believe that full disclosure should be achieved through annual reports, annual meetings, interim financial statements, and periodic announcements when appropriate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>So many announcements are unnecessary and unconstructive. We believe that Fairfax and its subsidiaries should be judged by long-term results, not by &#8216;good&#8217; or &#8216;bad&#8217; news.&#8221; This is why we often issue &#8220;no comment&#8221; notices to the media.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Regarding Fairfax stock, Prem Watsa always emphasizes that he expects the stock price to grow in line with the book value, but investors can also expect that for a period of time one will lag behind the other. However, he says that over time, this correlation will revert to the mean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He stated, &#8220;If you can&#8217;t handle short-term volatility, then we might not be the right stock for you.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Regarding_the_issue_of_shares_at_a_discount\"><\/span>Regarding the issue of shares at a discount<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Prem Vatesa told shareholders, &#8220;We are very cautious about issuing shares. We avoid acquiring companies at twice their book value and raise funds by issuing our own shares at a discount to book value. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>We wouldn&#8217;t issue shares if they weren&#8217;t sold at a fair price, and therefore we wouldn&#8217;t have acquired Continental. You should remember that we never aimed to grow bigger\u2014we just wanted to deliver attractive long-term returns to shareholder capital by treating our customers, employees, and shareholders fairly.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Funding_Acquisitions_with_Share_Issuance\"><\/span>Funding Acquisitions with Share Issuance<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The company issued three million shares to acquire Ranger and Lombard (Continental), and another 1.1 million shares for the acquisitions of Odyssey (Skandia) and CTR.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For the acquisitions of Crum &amp; Forster, Fairfax issued one million shares at C$475 per share, plus a $400 million bond issuance. For the acquisition of TIG, Fairfax issued another two million shares at C$500 per share. These new share issuances to raise funds for acquisitions presented two problems. First, Fairfax wanted to buy back these shares but faced a funding shortage. Second, more new shareholders joined with high expectations for a stock price rebound. What would they think if the darling of the stock market turned sour?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These two deals were significant, transforming Fairfax into a major U.S. insurance company. Crum &amp; Forster, after years of testing Fairfax&#8217;s patience and finances, ultimately became one of its best-performing assets. TIG quickly collapsed but still contributed some valuable assets to the group. This mitigated the impact of the aforementioned two problems on the group&#8217;s finances and profitability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Short_Selling\"><\/span>Short Selling<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Fairfax terminated its failed hedge fund in 2016, wiping out 100% of its operating income since 2010 ($4.4 billion). In 2016, the company&#8217;s five-year equity return was negative 7%, while the S&amp;P 500 rose nearly 15%. A $1.2 billion investment loss led to a full-year loss of $512 million, marking the company&#8217;s fourth loss in 31 years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Prem Watsa stated, &#8220;In the past, to protect our equity exposure during uncertain times, we shorted indices (primarily the S&amp;P 500 and Russell 2000) and a few common stocks.&#8221; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&#8220;After careful consideration and discussion, I realized that shorting is dangerous, very short-term in nature, and incompatible with long-term investing. The accumulated losses from shorting are approximately $2 billion.&#8221; He said, &#8220;There is no doubt that we should have sold off our hedges in 2011 and 2012 and focused on value investing, which is what we truly excel at.&#8221; &#8220;We should focus on finding good companies at reasonable prices.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Afterwards, Prem Watsa publicly stated that he would no longer short sell! &#8220;Your chairman is slowly learning!&#8221; he said, adding, &#8220;We don&#8217;t understand these markets, so we stay away. Buyers beware!&#8221; Prem Watsa believes the first rule is to avoid permanent capital outflows from the portfolio and holding company levels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Allied_the_Largest_Acquisition_in_History\"><\/span>Allied, the Largest Acquisition in History<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2017, Fairfax completed the largest deal in its history, acquiring Allied World Assurance Company Holdings for nearly $5 billion. This was a Bermuda-based property, casualty, and specialty insurance and reinsurance company, performing well at the time of the acquisition with approximately $3.5 billion in insured assets; the company boasted an excellent asset portfolio in North America and globally. Its average consolidation ratio since inception was a remarkable 90.7%.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The only problem was the company&#8217;s lack of a strong investment track record and internal disagreements about its next steps. This was precisely Fairfax&#8217;s strength, making the deal highly complementary. Over the past 15 years, Fairfax&#8217;s investment returns were approximately 20%, while Allied&#8217;s actual returns were only 12%.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"A_Typical_Value_Investor\"><\/span>A Typical Value Investor<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Value_Investing_Masters_Who_Influenced_Him\"><\/span>Value Investing Masters Who Influenced Him<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Value investing masters who influenced Prem Wattsah include Warren Buffett, Ben Graham, John Templeton, Philip Fisher, Charlie Munger, and Seth Klarman.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Books_that_influenced_him\"><\/span>Books that influenced him<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Security Analyst<\/em>, <em>The Intelligent Investor<\/em>, <em>Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits<\/em>, <em>The Warren Buffett Way<\/em>, <em>The Outsiders<\/em>, <em>The Art of Speculation<\/em>, and <em>Richer, Wiser, Happier<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Increasing_Emphasis_on_Corporate_Quality\"><\/span>Increasing Emphasis on Corporate Quality<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>In his 2020, 2021, and 2024 shareholder letters, Prem Vatsa quoted a passage from <em>The Art of Speculation<\/em>: &#8220;Good management is rare, at best difficult to assess, and it is undoubtedly the most important factor in stock analysis. Find a company whose owner is fully committed to profitable operations, even more concerned with profits five years from now than they are now! <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If he possesses good business judgment, the ability to select team members, and the rare ability to motivate them to achieve outstanding performance, then the company&#8217;s stock is worth investigating. Nothing can replace buying quality assets and letting them compound over the long term. Patience yields extraordinary profits.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Long-Term_Investing\"><\/span>Long-Term Investing<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Prem Vatsa frequently reminds shareholders against short-sightedness and market timing in his letters to shareholders. In his 2018 shareholder letter, he reflected: &#8220;Spring is coming, followed by summer. We just don&#8217;t know the exact date, there might be spring snow!&#8221; emphasizing the advantages of long-term investing, he wrote in a 1987 letter to shareholders, &#8220;I am often surprised that most people have forgotten the power of compound interest.&#8221; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"How_to_Track_Good_Companies\"><\/span>How to Track Good Companies?<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Fairfax advised investors to track a company&#8217;s cumulative return on equity (initially a target of 20% annual growth, later reduced to 15%) as a good indicator of long-term stock returns. He later emphasized that the growth of BV\/S (the ratio of share price to book value) was superior to ROE. Both are good indicators of future earnings and expected returns on equity, but BV\/S is less volatile than earnings per share and more correlated with stock price movements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Prem Vatsa&#8217;s 1997 annual letter is essential reading for anyone truly wanting to understand Fairfax&#8217;s thinking. In it, Vatsa discusses intrinsic value in depth with frankness. He states that he believes intrinsic value (without a precise figure) is higher than book value (which is explicitly calculated), meaning that intrinsic value will increase both book value and stock price over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The letter states: &#8220;Return on equity, or return on book value, is the link between book value and intrinsic value, because future earnings will be determined by return on equity. When a company like Fairfax has more than 20% equity, given that long-term interest rates are lower than this figure, the company&#8217;s intrinsic value will exceed its book value, and the stock price will reflect this intrinsic value over time. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>So while stock prices may fluctuate in the short term\u2014reflecting both fear and greed\u2014they always reflect underlying intrinsic value in the long run. This is how we view the relationship between book value, intrinsic value, and stock price. We have given you a framework for assessing Fairfax&#8217;s value, but you must figure out the intrinsic value figure yourself.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A company&#8217;s intrinsic value allows you to incorporate factors such as excellent management, long-term employee retention, and corporate culture when analyzing a company. These things may not be priced, but they become considerations. Therefore, they can provide a margin of safety for investment and create a competitive moat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As Prem Vatesa stated, &#8220;The actual business of insurance isn&#8217;t that differentiated. Our difference lies in culture.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Share_Buybacks\"><\/span>Share Buybacks<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Fairfax considers buying back its own stock whenever it deems it cheap. The company has also made it clear that while it will issue more shares from time to time to cover acquisition costs, it hopes to gradually buy back these shares to avoid dilution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In 1990, when the stock price plummeted by 60%, the company began buying bargains. Fairfax bought as much as possible, and Prem Vatesa explained the strategy to shareholders in a letter the following spring: &#8220;We cancelled 1.84 million shares in 1990, approximately 25% of the outstanding shares. This was an excellent investment in potential earnings and book value per share for Fairfax.&#8221; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This also meant that almost all of the company&#8217;s two million shares issued in its early years\u2014the two million issued in 1986\u2014were bought back. The book value per share increased by 24% the following year. By 1992, 2.1 million shares had been cancelled, representing 34% of the total outstanding shares. &#8220;We believe that, given the share price is close to book value, it would be beneficial for shareholders to buy back and retire the stock, provided it is within our financial means.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Dividend_Payments\"><\/span>Dividend Payments<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Initially, the company shared Buffett&#8217;s view on dividends, refusing to pay them, believing that reinvesting these funds would be more efficient and would avoid double taxation for shareholders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, in 2000, Fairfax changed its mind and began actually paying dividends; otherwise, it would have required paying the CEO a higher salary. That year, Prem Vatsa eliminated performance bonuses, replacing them with a fixed salary of $600,000 CAD, and finally saw dividends from a new and personalized perspective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Company_Acquisition_Principles\"><\/span>Company Acquisition Principles<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>In his second letter, Prem Vatsa outlined his acquisition creed as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Buy companies that are already well-managed.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Only buy companies that can achieve performance targets.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The company will operate independently, and performance will be measured against the same targets.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Fairfax stock is as valuable as cash. When the stock is issued, Fairfax will receive a value commensurate with its worth.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Operating_Guidelines_for_Subsidiaries\"><\/span>Operating Guidelines for Subsidiaries<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Following the acquisition, Prem Vatesa clearly outlined the following guidelines regarding responsibilities between headquarters and the acquired company:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Headquarters is responsible for financing and capital decisions.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The original teams are responsible for running their own companies, but headquarters will evaluate their performance.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Credit_Rating_Agencies_Dislike_Fairfax\"><\/span>Credit Rating Agencies Dislike Fairfax<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Prem Vatesa stated, \u201cFor decades, these agencies have rated us the same way. No matter what we do, they just don\u2019t like our decentralized model. They think we are riskier and more complex than most companies; it doesn\u2019t matter what our performance, return on equity, or the book value growth we show. They want to see a longer track record. They don\u2019t like our investment strategy. They don\u2019t like our governance.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In mid-2004, Fairfax took the rare step of issuing a press release clarifying its relationship with Fitch, specifically stating that Fitch could not obtain Fairfax\u2019s financial information like other agents and therefore could not issue a rating or comment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"80\" height=\"122\" src=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/Fairfax-Custom.jpg\" alt=\"The Fairfax Way\" class=\"wp-image-41767\"\/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Relative_articles\"><\/span>Relative articles<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>&#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2025\/05\/27\/benjamin-graham-on-value-investing-grahams-bio-book\/\">&#8220;Benjamin Graham on Value Investing&#8221;, Graham&#8217;s bio book<\/a>&#8220;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>&#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2021\/11\/17\/outsiders\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Outsiders, one of the greatest investment books for managment team<\/a>&#8220;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>&#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/2022\/12\/17\/dear-shareholder\/\">Dear Shareholder<\/a>&#8220;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><em><strong>Disclaimer<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em>The content of this site is the author\u2019s personal opinions and is for reference only. I am not responsible for the correctness, opinions, and immediacy of the content and information of the article. Readers must make their own judgments.<\/em><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><em>I shall not be liable for any damages or other legal liabilities for the direct or indirect losses caused by the readers&#8217; direct or indirect reliance on and reference to the information on this site, or all the responsibilities arising therefrom, as a result of any investment behavior.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>&#8220;The Fairfax Way&#8221; introduces Fairfax, Berkshire Hathaway&#8217;s Canadian subsidiary. Fairfax&#8217;s annualized stock return over 40 years is as high as 19.5%, a figure quite close to Warren Buffett&#8217;s 19.8% over 61 years.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":41767,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,527,591,1470,1305,10],"tags":[1618,876,1620],"class_list":["post-41765","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-investing-books","category-company-bio","category-company-culture","category-company-management","category-diversified-conglomerate-group","category-investing-guru","tag-farefax","tag-frfhf","tag-mrl"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41765","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=41765"}],"version-history":[{"count":17,"href":"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41765\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":41792,"href":"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41765\/revisions\/41792"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/41767"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=41765"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=41765"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.granitefirm.com\/blog\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=41765"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}